This paper is the first to draw a global picture of worldwide microfinance equity by taking full advantage of daily quoted prices. We revisit previous findings showing that investors should consider microfinance as a self-standing sector. Our results are threefold. First, microfinance has become less risky and more closely correlated with the financial sector. This convergence is associated with a decline in the proportion of women borrowers. Second, microfinance and finance shares have equivalent currency exposure. Last, introducing a self-standing microfinance sector presents few diversification benefits. This paper confirms that microfinance has changed dramatically during the last decade.
Introduction
The microfinance industry offers attractive opportunities to investors who want to help alleviate poverty in developing countries. Furthermore, microfinance is often perceived as different from conventional finance. It is thought to be riskier because borrowers generally have no collateral and little or no credit history to underpin a precise assessment of their credit risk. Despite this, investing in microfinance is also viewed as a way of diversifying from international markets in general and the conventional financial sector in particular (Gonzalez, 2007; Krauss & Walter, 2009; Di Bella, 2011; Galema, Lensink, & Spierdijk, 2011) . This diversification effect stems from the special nature of microfinance institutions, which are driven by a double bottom-line (social and financial), and from the fact that they are less leveraged than traditional financial institutions. By scrutinizing the most recent trends of this rapidly evolving industry, this paper aims to check whether investors still need to consider microfinance as a self-standing sector. To this end, it examines both the risk factors associated with microfinance and the diversification benefits of microfinance investment.
Microfinance has changed dramatically during the last decade, moving from a universe of donor-financed NGOs towards a widely disparate industry (Mersland, 2009) , including a growing number of commercial banks. Simultaneously, socially responsible investments have gained momentum on financial markets. We assess the impact of microfinance equity on globally diversified portfolios by using the classical tools of portfolio analysis. For that purpose, we construct original microfinance country indices, analyze their movements, and assess them in reference to comparable indices for the financial sector and to national indices.
We also take international equity indices into consideration.
1 Our findings show that although 4 the microfinance sector has definitely moved closer to conventional finance, the risk-return trade-off has also changed. 2 Microfinance equity is now less risky than before, but it is also much more closely correlated with the financial sector, and yields fewer diversification benefits. We conclude that microfinance can reasonably be considered as part of the financial sector.
Two types of public investments in microfinance are currently available: Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) 3 and listed equity of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). For reasons of data availability, this paper concentrates on listed MFIs. Arguably, microfinance equity is not representative of the whole sector. 4 However, while confined to a relatively small number of assets, microfinance equity has the considerable advantage over MIVs of being publicly priced daily on stock exchanges. This makes it more transparent and allows for deeper financial analysis. Conversely, MIVs invest in several MFIs mainly through loans, but the content of their portfolios is often opaque, 5 making it difficult for outsiders to assess the actual level of risk.
The microfinance sector has experienced successful initial public offerings (IPOs) such as the highly publicized flotation of Banco Compartamos in Mexico in 2007. These IPOs have nevertheless been criticized by influential players, including Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Kneiding, 2009 ). Wall's Street Advisor Services (WSAS) has also released a set of benchmarks for investments in MFIs, the WSAS MFI Shareholder Value Indices, computed from book values (see http://www.wallsstreetadvisorservices.com/). By contrast, our indices are based on market prices only.
2 Our paper examines whether this assertion holds true for investors who are seeking financial returns only.
Alternatively, financial and social returns can be combined (see Drut, 2010; Dorfleitner, Leidl, & Reeder, 2012) .
3 See e.g. Matthäus-Maier and von Pischke (2006) . 4 In particular, many MFIs still rely on subsidies for reaching financial sustainability (Hudon, 2010; Nawaz, 2010; Hudon & Traca, 2011) . 5 The authors -and colleagues from other universities -have tried for years to obtain data on MIVs with little success. Regarding transparency, MIVs tend to adopt an attitude comparable to that of hedge funds.
Yunus, who views the Compartamos IPO as mission drift 6 that compromises the sector's reputation (see Ashta & Hudon, 2012 , for a detailed discussion). Leaving ethical and missionbased considerations aside, this paper is the first, to our knowledge, to start from observable returns of publicly traded MFIs. From a portfolio perspective, these returns are to be judged not only on a case-by-case basis but also in regard to their correlation with other assets.
Previous work has already investigated the financial properties of microfinance converge toward those of their domestic banks. In this paper, we construct microfinance country equity indices and an international Global Microfinance Index (GMI) . We analyze the changes in these indices, assessing them in reference to comparable indices for the financial sector and also to national indices. Our findings show that microfinance has been closely 6 Microfinance mission drift stems from the double bottom-line (social and financial) embodied by the MFIs. An MFI is said to be mission-drifted when it sacrifices its social mission (typically, poverty alleviation and/or women's empowerment) for financial purposes (see, e.g., McIntosh & Wydick, 2005; Copestake, 2007; Ghosh & Van Tassel, 2008; Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the database and methodology. In section 3, we study the joint movements of the finance and microfinance indices.
In section 4, we analyze microfinance risk exposures by estimating both a local CAPM including the foreign-exchange factor and an international four-factor model. Section 5 assesses the diversification benefits of microfinance stocks. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Methodology
We consider the complete universe of listed MFIs. 7 This exhaustive approach is a real advance over the existing literature because the securities in question are the only assets that allow investors attracted by the microfinance sector to gain direct access to the capital of MFIs. The alternative, MIVs, concentrates primarily on loans to MFIs (Reille, GlisovicMezieres, Berthouzoz, & Milverton, 2009) , and the choice of institutions benefiting from them is often unclear. 7 We follow De Mariz, Reille and Rozas (2011) and consider listed institutions with daily liquidity of at least USD 0.2 million. This ensures that prices are not distorted by supply/demand imbalances. Actually, we only exclude SKS, the Indian quoted MFI, because its IPO is too recent (August 2010).
8 capital structure. As pointed out by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2011), complying with regulations affects the characteristics of microfinance institutions. Second, many nonlisted MFIs still rely on subsidies, which may hinder financial performance. Bogan (2012) points out that long-term use of grants perpetuates inefficiencies by insulating MFIs from competitive pressure. In contrast, listed firms are exposed to competition, as they need to attract market funding.
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< Insert Table I here >
The social performances reported in Table I are summarized by three indicators widely used in microfinance: average loan size, measured by the average loan balance per borrower scaled by GNI per capita; the interest rate charged on loans, proxied by the nominal yield on gross portfolio; and the share of female borrowers.
11
Listed MFIs exhibit average loan sizes in a range comparable to those of their non-listed counterparts. In contrast, the interest rates charged by listed MFIs (above 50% a year on average) are higher, although not significantly so, than those charged by non-listed MFIs (between 24% and 38% a year on average). The high level of interest rates charged to poor borrowers is a controversial issue in microfinance, especially from an ethical standpoint 10 In microfinance this basic capitalistic principle is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the shareholders of listed MFIs include charitable institutions and socially responsible investors who are ready to tolerate some financial sacrifices in exchange for fulfilling a social mission.
11 Despite being widely used in practice, these indicators are not free from criticisms. For instance, average loan size is a poor indicator for at least two reasons. First, it is abusively penalizing for cross-subsidization and progressive lending (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011) . Second, its use can create a perverse incentive to offer disadvantageous credit conditions to some client segments, such as women and discriminated-against minorities (Agier & Szafarz, 2013) .
9 (Hudon, 2007) . Practitioners argue that high interest rates are inevitable without subsidization, mainly because the operational costs associated with managing small loans are high (Fernando, 2006) . Strikingly, listed MFIs serve 78% of female borrowers on average, which places them slightly above their non-listed counterparts (from 50% to 76%). Again, the differences are hardly significant. Overall, the social performances of listed MFIs do not depart from those of the rest of the industry. IPOs per se do not seem to entail mission drift. This is a promising sign for the future of microfinance, as commercialization currently represents a strong trend in the industry (Bogan, 2012) and new IPOs are to be expected in the near future.
Listed MFIs represent less than 0.1% of world market capitalization. Relative to their domestic market, however, most microfinance stocks are far from negligible. To get a clear picture, Table II reports data on market capitalizations for all finance and microfinance stocks in our dataset, as well as the shares of their countries in the world's emerging stock markets.
All market capitalizations are computed from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
indices. In the countries where microfinance has listed stocks, we give the capitalization of these stocks with respect to both their domestic finance-plus-microfinance (F+MF) sector (Table II , column 5), and their domestic equity market (Table II , column 6). In most cases, the market shares of microfinance stocks are comparable to those of mainstream financial stocks. This is especially relevant for Kenya, where Equity Bank dominates the F+MF sector (31%) and accounts for a notable 14% of the domestic stock market. To obtain a scaling perspective, Table II also provides the market shares of the countries at stake in F+MF sectors in the worldwide emerging-finance sector (column 7), and in the emerging-market universe (column 8). Together, the five countries under scrutiny account for 9.61% of the emerging financial sector and 12.4% of the emerging-market universe. The history of the microfinance industry in South Africa is singular (see Porteous & Hazelhurst, 2004; Napier, 2006) . After having experienced full deregulation in the post-apartheid period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , which enhanced commercial microcredit activities, the sector started to be supervised by the Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) which is "entrusted with the responsibility of regulating the activities of the micro lending sector and to protect consumers against deceptive and unfair lending practices in terms of the Usury Act Exemption Notice Bangladesh experienced a major financial sector reform, initiated by the World Bank at the beginning of the 1990s and pursued by the government after 1996, with a view to expanding and diversifying the sector and privatizing national banks (Uddin & Hopper, 2003) .
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The Global Finance Index Comparator 16 (GFI-C) aggregates the five local indices.
However, to allow rational comparisons with the GMI, the country weights in the GFI-C are constrained to be those of the GMI. Specifically, the weight of each country in both the GMI and the GFI-C is dictated by the size of its microfinance sector (converted to USD).
Interestingly, on the Indonesian stock market the microfinance sector (present since 1990)
predates the banking sector (present since 1996). As a result, the GFI-C can be defined only for the period starting in November 1996. Africa to 51.6% for Indonesia) is much lower than for microfinance indices. These results 16 The Global Finance Index (GFI) provided by MSCI aggregates 21 country indices for the finance sector. It covers a much larger universe than our in-house GFI-C.
also apply to the GFI-C index, whose average annualized monthly return (22.5%) is slightly higher than that of the GMI index (20.3%), and with lower volatility (47.5% versus 56%).
Joint Movements of the Finance and Microfinance Global Indices
To facilitate comparison of our two global indices, the GFI-C for finance and the GMI for microfinance, a common base was set at December 1996. The graph of daily cumulative returns of the GFI-C and GMI ( Figure 3 ) shows that after a period of great disparity between finance and microfinance, with higher instability for microfinance, a phenomenon of convergence appeared. In fact, the correlation between the GMI and the GFI-C rose from 33%
over the first half of the sample period (until December 2003) to 79% during the second half.
Volatilities for the two series also differ by sub-period (initially 53% and then 30% for finance, and 76% and 34% for microfinance). The Engle and Sheppard (2001) test for constant conditional correlation confirms the instability of correlations at the 1% level.
17
To describe the joint movements of the GFI-C and GMI indices, we adopt DCC-MVGARCH 18 modeling (Engle & Sheppard, 2001; Engle, 2002) , which enables us to factor in dynamic conditional correlations. This approach is often used to model correlation dynamics between financial series (Kearney & Poti, 2006; Brière & Signori, 2009 Following the conventional approach (e.g., Engle, 2002; Chiang, Jeon, & Li, 2007) , the univariate GARCH processes for GFI-C and GMI are modeled using a GARCH (1,1) specification of the form: 
where A and B are non-negative parameters satisfying 1 AB  . The proper correlation matrix t R is given by:
We follow Engle's (2002) two-step log-likelihood estimation procedure for the DCC. (A and B) . With reference to parameter significance and information criteria, the best model is unambiguously the GARCH (1,1) for both series, which is also the most frequent specification for financial returns.
< Insert Table V here >
The coefficients of the lagged variance and innovation terms are highly significant, which is consistent with time-varying volatility and the appropriateness of the GARCH (1,1) specification. Both GARCH (1,1) univariate processes present a high degree of persistence We suggest an interpretation of convergence that combines both sides of the market. First, from the investor's perspective, convergence could result from a self-fulfilling learning mechanism starting from pre-IPO stock valuations by financial analysts. The literature on
IPOs stresses that experts lack information to value companies before they go public (Lowry, Officer, & Schwert, 2010) . Likewise, post-IPO prices are very erratic because investors are in a learning process (Lowry & Schwert, 2002) . Regarding microfinance, we hypothesize that the lack of information is huge, leaving pre-IPO experts no choice but to base their price estimates on finance stocks or indices. As a result, investors start their learning mechanism on post-IPO microfinance with stock prices linked to financial prices. This self-fulfilling contagious mechanism is fairly common in stock markets. 21 Second, from the MFI's perspective, going public inevitably affects the business model. We conjecture that the changes make MFIs behave more like banks than they did before the IPO. This trend would then reinforce the market-originating contagious mechanism initiated by financial experts.
IPOs probably represent the culmination of the commercialization trend occurring throughout the microfinance sector (Christen & Drake, 2001 ). This trend is associated in particular with savings mobilization, an activity typical of mainstream banks (Woller, 2002) .
In sum, both sides of the market offer reasonable arguments to rationalize the convergence This can be seen as evidence that convergence is still at work rather than already achieved. 21 Tsai and Lee (2012) put forward a similar convergence mechanism for Asian real estate investment trust (REIT) markets. It happens to converge toward the US REIT market although the underlying real estate securities in different countries are poorly related.
Regardless of the precise date of convergence, the reduction in volatilities at the aggregate level is probably due to the diminishing weight of recent IPOs in our two indices.
Is convergence between quoted microfinance and mainstream finance associated with mission drift, meaning the social aim was sacrificed to the financial bottom line? We address this issue by presenting social characteristics of listed MFIs over time in two different ways.
In both cases, we acknowledge the existence of time-and country-specific effects by normalizing the characteristics of the listed MFIs by their same-year same-country averages.
First, Figure 6 shows the changes in the three normalized social performances (average loan size, interest rate on loans, and share of female borrowers) averaged over the available Overall, both approaches deliver the same message, namely that IPOs seem to be associated with a decline in the share of women borrowers. Regarding average loan size and borrower interest rates, data variability prevents us from detecting any regularity. More generally, addressing mission drift with our dataset is challenging for several reasons. First, there are different social characteristics, and their relative importance varies not only across MFIs but also across regions (D'Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 2013) . Second, we have only yearly data for social performances, which contrasts sharply with the daily market prices we used to detect convergence. Last, as Table 1 shows, statistically significant differences on social performances are difficult to capture due to high dispersion in the data.
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In conclusion, the microfinance sector has been trending towards gradual integration into mainstream finance. However, it has retained some specific traits. Microfinance tends to develop in countries where the financial sector is relatively weak (Maksudova, 2010; Vanroose & D'Espallier, 2013) , 23 such that the regional distribution of listed MFIs differs from that of the traditional financial sector. From this point, although the two sectors are converging, the potential for microfinance to provide diversification in an equity portfolio can be distinguished from the diversification potential of finance by regional bias. Section 4 considers the nature of risks assumed by domestic and international investors in finance and microfinance equities.
Risk Factors of Microfinance Investment
The profitability of the microfinance sector is hotly debated. Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) are amongst the most successful. In addition to the market factor, the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) model uses three risk factors: "size," which relates to firm size; "value," which exploits the book-to-market ratio; and "momentum," 29 Unfortunately, a four-factor analysis is unfeasible at the country level because the FFC factors are unavailable for the emerging countries under scrutiny. 30 The market factor, MRP (Market Risk Premium), is the global excess return of the market (value-weighted return of 23 country indices) over the risk-free rate (one-month US Treasury Bills). The size factor, SMB (Small Minus Big), is the return on an international portfolio of small stocks (bottom 10% in terms of market capitalization) minus that of a portfolio of big stocks (top 90% capitalization). The value factor, HML (High Minus Low), is the return of a portfolio made of "value" stocks, i.e. those with high (top 30%) book-to-market ratio (book value of common equity divided by the market equity) minus that of a portfolio of "growth" stocks 23 < Insert Table VI here > finance. In general, market betas are higher for microfinance than for finance, signaling a higher systematic risk for MFIs than for traditional banks. However, the difference is hardly significant. The only borderline exception is Kenya, where microfinance exhibits a smaller market beta (0.72) than finance (0.95), the difference being significant at the 10% level. For all countries, R-squared values are relatively low (between 19% for South African microfinance and 55% for Indonesian finance), which is a typical feature of market beta estimation in emerging countries (Harvey, 1995) .
Exposure to the currency factor produces the intuitively expected result: Betas are negative in most cases. However, many of them are not significant, at least at the stock level. Interestingly, at the sector level, three out of four currency betas are significant for finance and two out of four for microfinance. Banks and MFIs often fund their portfolios through debt in foreign currency, especially USD (Crabb, 2004) . When the dollar appreciates, financing becomes more expensive but the institutions' revenues (from repayment of loans contracted in (bottom 30% book-to-market ratio). The momentum factor, WML (Winners Minus Losers) is the return of a portfolio of best-performing stocks (top 30%) minus that of a portfolio of worst-performing stocks (bottom 30%)
over the previous year.
24 local currency) remain fixed, thus penalizing them. Only a few MFIs are not exposed to foreign-exchange risk, either because they operate in a fully dollarized economy, or because they solely trade in local currency. Foreign-exchange betas are not significantly different for the finance and microfinance sectors, meaning that the two types of institution share similar exposures. Table VII here > reveal that, except for Bangladesh, most market betas are significant and higher than the beta for both microfinance and finance. This likely reflects the higher systematic risk of equity from emerging countries compared with a well-diversified world portfolio balanced between emerging-and developed-market stocks. Market betas are higher for microfinance than for finance. In South Africa, the HML factor loading is positive and strongly significant for finance stocks but mostly insignificant for microfinance ones. This is in line with the observation from the report by O'Donohoe et al. (2009, p. 33) indicating that quoted microfinance "trades at a premium on a P/BV basis over traditional banks, though this premium has declined considerably since its peak in November 2007." The size and momentum betas exhibit little regularity. Except for Mexico, the Wald tests detect no difference between estimates for finance and microfinance stocks.
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Summing up, both the finance and the microfinance sectors exhibit high market betas, locally and globally. Moreover, domestic investors in both sectors are significantly exposed to 25 foreign-exchange risk. Lastly, that microfinance is converging towards mainstream finance is confirmed by the proximity of their market and foreign-exchange betas in domestic markets.
Diversification Benefits
Spanning tests examine whether including an external asset in a portfolio of benchmark assets shifts the pre-existing efficient frontier to the left. Here, we use the mean-variance spanning test 31 proposed by Huberman and Kandel (1987) to assess the diversification benefits of microfinance stocks for optimal portfolios of financial stocks. This test involves running OLS regressions of the returns of the external asset, E R , on the returns of the K benchmark assets,
, as follows:
Under the null hypothesis of spanning, constant  is equal to zero and the sum of the k  coefficients is equal to one.
We consider two different scenarios. The first, and most general, concerns the situation of a U.S. investor whose pre-existing portfolio consists of financial stocks from the 21 countries represented in the MSCI Global Finance Index (GFI). We successively check whether each country's microfinance stocks and our global microfinance index (GMI) are spanned by this universe. Second, we assess the diversification benefits of microfinance 31 An alternative option is to use mean-variance efficiency tests (Basak, Jagannathan, & Sun, 2002; Brière, Drut, Mignon, Oosterlinck, & Szafarz, 2013) Interestingly, these results contrast with previous ones from Galema et al. (2011) , who find stronger evidence of diversification benefits from microfinance. Those differences could be due to at least two methodological discrepancies. First, we use monthly stock prices whereas Galema et al. (2011) use annual returns computed from book earnings. The authors do so to consider a large set of investment opportunities in the microfinance sector. In practice, however, these opportunities are hard to seize as they mostly stem from non-quoted institutions. Second, the sample period used by Galema et al. (2011) stretches from 1997 to 2007, which means that their data are more deeply affected than ours by the pre-convergence 27 period. The convergence of microfinance on mainstream finance makes the sector less appealing to investors blind to poverty alleviation.
Still, our findings should not be taken at face value for several reasons. First, quoted microfinance stocks are present in five emerging countries only. The global capitalization of these five is negligible with respect to the world market (0.1%) and represents a small fraction of the emerging market universe (12.4%). Second, the distributions of the test statistics have been established asymptotically under the assumption that returns are normal, which is far from being verified in our dataset. Given this evidence, conclusions need to be drawn in a conservative way.
Overall, despite data issues that can alter the precision of our results, the central message is unambiguous. Considering microfinance as a separate sector yields few diversification benefits, if any, for a portfolio holder invested in finance stocks.
Conclusion
Despite the impressive development of the microfinance sector, the financial performance of microfinance equity is poorly understood. This is probably due to data availability issues.
Although suffering from data limitations, this paper takes full advantage of daily quoted prices of microfinance stocks since their issuance, and draws a global picture of worldwide microfinance equity. Two main messages stand out. First, we have demonstrated that microfinance had largely converged on the mainstream financial sector. This is consistent with the evidence that the MFIs that issue stocks are those that behave most like banks without really intending to serve the poorest of the poor (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 28 2007) . Although the situation is far from homogenous across countries, the picture that emerges from factor analysis is consistent with the convergence outcome. Moreover, we have confirmed the intuition that MFIs and banks are both highly exposed to exchange rate risk, probably because they obtain most of their funding from international capital markets.
Second, spanning tests show that the diversification potential of microfinance stocks within the financial sector is minimal. Microfinance equity may be disregarded at virtually no cost by profit-oriented investors seeking new investment opportunities in developing countries. Obviously, this evidence does not hold for investors who are concerned (even slightly) by social outcomes in general 32 and financial access for the poor in developing countries in particular. In this respect, listed microfinance can be a halfway solution between a purely profit-oriented investment and NGO-type financing through donations/subsidies or subsidised loans.
Ultimately, the question is whether the development of listed microfinance is associated with mission drift. Our investigation provides a nuanced answer to that question.
Even though interest rates are higher on average, listed MFIs grant loans that are similar in size to those of other MFIs. Our results also suggest that the convergence of microfinance and mainstream finance may coincide with a decline in the share of women borrowers, but this evidence requires further confirmation. Overall, this paper delivers an encouraging message, namely that listed microfinance equity still generates significant social performances.
A seminal contribution in many respects, this paper also suffers from econometric drawbacks. The main problem likely relates to the underlying probability distributions of the returns. As the descriptive statistics have amply shown, we are dealing with series that depart 32 Microfinance is now seen as part of a broader asset class called "impact investment" designed to yield both a financial return and a broader benefit to society ("Impact Investing: Happy returns, the Emergence of a New
Asset Class", The Economist, September 2011).
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significantly not only from normality, a common feature of most financial series, but also from the typical heavy-tail distributions that financial econometricians are used to dealing with. Moreover, MFIs have very different size, geographic location, and other characteristics compared with the entire financial sector. Finding a more carefully-matched sample might yield more insights. We therefore view our empirical results as challenging but still preliminary, and we hope they will motivate further studies in this area. Indeed, the quoted microfinance sector is still in its infancy, and a clearer understanding of what drives its performance is likely to emerge with time.
Lastly, emerging financial markets have been documented as a key source of diversification for Western portfolio holders (Bekaert & Harvey, 2003; Quisenberry & Griffith, 2010) . However, the optimal composition of portfolios made up of emerging-country stocks remains largely unexplored, especially with respect to their sensitivity to global crises.
In this respect, one promising avenue for research is the way sector-specific and/or countryspecific investments could help robustify global portfolios (Brière & Szafarz, 2008; Brière, Burgues, & Signori, 2010) . For this, adequate sector delineation is a prerequisite. Our paper has also taken steps in that direction. This table reports the Wald statistics for the mean-variance spanning tests. The benchmark stock indices are (1) GFI-C, (2) South Africa (3) Kenya, (4) Indonesia, (5) Bangladesh, (6) Mexico finance indices. GMI is the Global Microfinance Index, GFI-C the Global Finance Index. MI and FI are the local microfinance and finance indices, respectively. ***/**/* indicate that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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